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This is a study of the various constituents of a mineral policy 
and the criteria it should contain if it is competing for direct 
foreign investment. Items considered are (1) the type of mineral 
policy, (2) the type of ownership, and (3) the various methods of 
administration. Included is an example of a proposed model mineral 
policy and discussions relating to the expectations of the foreign 
investor and the host country. Excluded are regulations pertaining 
to the development of petroleum resources.
The mineral policy of three countries--Indonesia, Mexico, and 
Canada--are presented to illustrate the diverse forms a mineral 
policy can assume, incorporating a type of policy and ownership, and 
methods of administration. The effectiveness of the particular type 
of policy relating to the intentions of the policy maker and the 
consideration of changes are analyzed.
The principal theme found throughout the study of the policies 
of several nations is self-determination and the utilization of the 
mineral resources to establish an industrialized economy in the 
host country.
0 or UKES







Development Pattern of Mineral Policies ...........................  3
Factors Affecting Changes in Mineral Policies , 4
Costs and Benefits of Direct Foreign
Investment in the Mineral Industry ......................... 7
Types of Mineral Policies......................................  10
Types of Ownership.............................................  11
Policy Considerations for Model Mineral Laws....................... 14/f
State's Interest ...............................................  15
Investor's Interest.............................................  15
Consumer's Interest.............................................  17
Administration.............................................  18
Document of Title  .................. ...............  18
Financial........................................................ - 20
Settlement of Disputes ......................................  21
Mineral Policy of Indonesia......................................  23
Application Procedure for Foreign
Participation in Mining....................................  25
Contract Regulations ...........................................  26
Stages of Work.............................................  26
F i n a ncing.................................................  26
Company Commitments........... * ........................  27
Revenues to the Host Country.............................  29





Mineral Policy of Mexico............................................. 34
Application Procedure for Foreign
Participation in Mining......................................  37
Concession Regulations.................... .................... 37
Common-Mining Concession.  ......................... 38
Special-Mining Concession ................................ 40
Beneficiat ion -Plant Concession...........................  40
Organization of Mining Companies .............................  41
Revenues to the Host C o u n t r y ..................................  42
Foreign-Investment Incentives.................................. 43
Effectiveness of the Mexican Mineral Policy..................  45
Changes in the Mineral Policy..................................  52
Mineral Policy of Canada.................. ..........................  55
Application Procedure for Foreign
Participation in Mining. . . . . .  .........................  56
Mineral Laws of British Columbia .............................  57
Revenues to the Host C o u n t r y .................................. 58
Foreign Investment Incentives. . . . . .  ....................  59
Effectiveness of the Canadian Mineral Policy ................ 60
Changes in the Mineral Policy.................................. 65
Future of the Canadian Mineral Policy......................... 68
Analysis of the Mineral Policies....................................  73/
S u m m a r y ............................  •    79





Table 1. Royalty Rates of Selected Minerals
Mined in Indonesia......................................  30
2. Corporation Tax Rates in Indonesia.......................  32
3. Combined Production and Export Taxes
on Certain Minerals Mined in M e x i c o ................ 44
4. Value of Mexico's metallic and nonmetallic
Mineral Production, 1957-1971 .........................  47
5. Salient Statistics of Copper Production
and Consumption in Mexico, 1957-1971................ 49
6. Salient Statistics of Lead Production
and Consumption in Mexico, 1957-1971..................  50
7. Annual Exploration and Development
Expenditures in British Columbia....................  62
8. Annual Value of Mineral Production
in British Columbia, 1961-1970......................... 63
9. Estimated Book Value, Ownership,
and Control of Capital Employed in




This paper is the report on a study of the mineral policies of 
foreign nations in general, indicating the types of policies which 
differ due to the needs of the host country, the type of ownership 
in the mineral industry, and the methods of administration. The 
important facets of the mineral policies of Canada, Indonesia, and 
Mexico are examined with the major emphasis on those of Canada and 
Mexico, indicating changes that were or are being made and the 
reasons therefore. Excluded are regulations governing the 
development of petroleum resources.
For a comparison of these policies a model mineral policy as 
advocated by an authority in the field of international mineral 
legislation is noted.
For the placement of the study in prospective regarding the 
United States, the following thoughts are stated.
Our increasing reliance upon foreign sources of minerals makes 
our mineral-oriented foreign investors apprehensive about mineral 
policies of countries because of three somewhat interrelated problems:
(1) expropriations, confiscations, and forced modifications of agree­
ments in foreign countries have severed the flow to the United States 
of materials produced in foreign countries by American firms and have 
made the materials more costly; (2) the United States firms are 
encountering greater competition for foreign mineral supplies; and 
(3) increasing dependence on foreign sources for necessary mineral
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supplies focuses and constrains the United States foreign policy 
while threatening the stability of the U.S. economy.
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DEVELOPMENT PATTERN OF MINERAL POLICIES
Mineral resources differ from many other natural resources such 
as agricultural in that they are not renewable. Some nations are 
endowed with an abundance of mineral resources while other nations 
have few mineral resources.
Historically mineral resources have been used to build an 
industrial economy in many of the well-developed countries and thus 
to establish an advanced standard of living. Many of these developed 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, did not possess these resources 
within the boundaries of the homeland but acquired them from colonized 
countries established throughout the world. Patterns of trade were 
established whereby the raw materials were imported into Great Britain 
and consumer items fabricated, some of which were exported to the 
countries where the raw or primary materials originated.
This pattern was common to the other industrialized countries 
at that time but has since changed. The one factor differing is that 
the source of raw material originates in countries not controlled 
politically by the industrialized nations. The need for natural 
resources, such as minerals, influences the foreign policy of nations, 
the political alignment of these nations, and resulting trade patterns.
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As a result of this evolution of development the world has become 
divided into the developed or industrialized nations and the developing 
nations. Prebisch (1966, p. 435-465) presents this as the industrial 
centers (the developed countries) and the peripheral countries (the 
developing countries) which supply the raw materials to the industrial 
centers. In a situation of this type the peripheral countries do not 
obtain so great a benefit from the exploitation of the mineral 
resources as they would if the resources were processed into consumer 
items for domestic use and export. This situation is changing as the 
developing nations endowed with mineral resources are using their own 
minerals as a means of diversifying their economic base and progressing 
toward industrialization.
To this end these nations are establishing mineral policies which 
vary with the individual country based upon its needs and position of 
strength.
Factors Affecting Changes in Mineral Policy
The traditional view of a mineral policy, based on experience of 
the 19th century, is concerned with the production of primary commodi­
ties for export as the required motivator for economic growth in a 
developing country.
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Critics of this traditional view, Raul Prebisch, Gunnar Myrdal, 
and Hans Singer, among others, during the 1950fs argued that the 
benefits from the trade of primary commodities are derived by the 
industrial countries. The foreign and domestic investment--unless 
properly balanced to develop a diversified industrial economic base-- 
may actually retard the development of an industrial economy in the 
host country.
The arguments against an export-oriented resource-development 
program can be separated into four groups: (1) misdirection of
revenues from the exports not benefiting the majority of the popula­
tion, (2) dependence upon exports for which there is a wide fluctuation 
in revenues, (3) conservation of these export commodities for the 
future domestic welfare of the country, and (4) "unbalanced" growth 
dominated by an industry that draws skilled labor away from other 
sectors.
The first argument is based on the colonial history in Africa and 
Asia when export industries were created by the foreign investors 
essentially controlling the flow of revenues from the exports. Often 
the revenues were used to purchase consumptive items and construct 
buildings, luxury housing, and other nonproductive investments. There 
appeared to be no attempt to develop an infrastructure for developing 
a diversified economic base; the transportation and construction 
facilities were concentrated within and for the benefit of the export 
industry alone. However, without direct foreign investment in resource
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industries and resulting export industries, it is conceivable that the 
country may not have advanced beyond a subsistence economy. Some 
direct foreign investment critics argue that the investors should 
develop a manufacturing industry instead of or use it to complement 
the investment in the resources. The incentive to invest in manufac­
turing is not present if an adequate domestic market does not exist.
The second argument against investment in primary resource 
industries for export concerns the disadvantages of being dependent 
upon materials for which there is a world competitiveness, both in 
supply and demand resulting in wide fluctuations in price and revenue. 
If this disadvantage is to be countered, it is argued that over a long 
run countries can benefit more by producing the resource and manufac­
turing import substitution and export products.
The third argument recommends that mineral resources should be 
conserved for future domestic use or the usage be governed to avoid 
a rapid depletion of the country's major source of foreign exchange. 
Generally the critics are more concerned about the rate of depletion 
than the ban on extraction per se; a counter argument would be that 
resource development and production complement each other to result 
in the discovery of additional reserves. Also the conservation of 
resources is counter to the theory of the time-value of money resulting 
from the development and utilization of the mineral resources.
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The fourth argument is based on the inference that an industry 
which could contribute more to the balanced economic growth of the 
nation cannot be developed because the skilled labor is drawn to the 
export-oriented industry.
The important question for developing countries is not whether to 
produce primary commodities for export or to manufacture for home use 
or export, but how to produce primary resource commodities to make the 
maximum contribution to the domestic economy. The answer to this 
question is generally mirrored in the type of mineral policy, which 
is a reflection of the country's current bargaining position relative 
to its natural resources. Therefore, the mineral policy of countries 
will differ, depending upon the source of capital for investment 
(foreign or domestic), the alternative uses of other resources required 
to develop the mineral resources, the political atmosphere of the 
country, the degree of economic development within the country, and the 
physical characteristics (raw or finished product) of the commodity 
being marketed.
As with most decisions, there are costs and benefits to be 
derived when a policy is being implemented.
Costs and Benefits of Direct Foreign Investment 
in the Mineral Industry
Benefits of foreign investment can be categorized as (1) providing 
ajsource_jof ̂ capital, (2) providing an estahlished__export_ market,, (3) 
providing a source of technology and training, (4) providing regional 
development, (5) providing a source of employment and income, and (6) 
contributing to the balance of payments.
Unfortunately for the developing country, there is not always an 
internal source of capital with which to develop a resources-oriented 
industry. If existing conditions provide the required incentive, 
foreign capital can be attracted to the country to develop these 
resources. This incentive usually has to offset risks such as the 
instability of the government and foreign exchange rates. But if the 
proper rapport is attained and a source of capital is arranged, the 
remaining benefits of a market, technology and training, regional 
development, and balance of payments are usually realized.
Costs related to foreign investment are (1) leverage applied by 
foreign government to domestic policies due to control of resources, 
(2) misallocation of domestic resources to develop supporting public 
facilities for resource industry at expense of more needed infra­
structure developments, (3) emphasis on capital-intensive rather than 
labor-intensive industry, (4) loss of full benefits to be derived from 
resource development in terms of revenues and employment, (5) possible 
excessive upward pressure on exchange rates, and (6) difficulty of an 
independent domestic company to enter the industry either at the 
extractive or processing levels.
It is possible for a foreign government, because of pressure from 
the investor or for the economic advantage of the nation, to attempt 
through the control of the host country's natural resources to impose 
economic and industrial objectives which are not in agreement with the 
host company's objectives and priorities.
Some countries allow tax incentives and subsidize transportation 
facilities to encourage development in remote areas with the intention
T-1554 9
of providing access to underdeveloped regions. It has proved successful 
in several nations by not only allowing access to mineral resources but 
also to previously inaccessible cultivatable lands. The danger in this 
procedure is that it may be done at the expense of a more productive 
infrastructure development.
The mineral resource industry is capital-intensive as opposed to 
labor-intensive industries such as agricultural; labor is generally the 
most abundant asset in undeveloped countries. Jobs in the resource 
industry are usually high paying, but there are relatively few of them. 
(For example— mineral production in Canada in 1970 accounted for about 
7 percent of the GNP, but only 1.4 percent of the labor force was 
directly employed in mining. However, resource development indirectly 
helped establish employment in other supporting industries. Government 
of Canada, 1972, p. 48.)
Because of the nature of the industry, backward linkage, full 
benefit in terms of revenue and employment are often not realized by 
the host country due to foreign investment in the extraction of mineral 
resources. The investment is made to procure a source of raw material 
which is then fabricated into consumer items in company facilities in 
the foreign country.
Dependent upon the host country's monetary policy, large capital 
inflows may increase the exchange rate of the country, which increase 
could hinder the competitive position of exports due to increased 
prices.
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Many of the mineral resource industries are controlled by only 
a few vertically integrated companies, a situation which could make it 
difficult for an independent, domestic or foreign, to enter the field 
in the host country if the resources were controlled by investments of 
these dominating companies. This would, in effect, eliminate 
competition and may hinder development of a local industry for 
manufacture of import substitution items.
Types of Mineral Policies
The types of policies relating to direct foreign investment in 
mineral resources can be classified as (1) countries which are open, 
(2) countries which desire to attract foreign capital but which 
negotiate terms, (3) countries which want to protect certain key 
sectors, and (4) countries which are restrictive.
The mineral policies of the United States and certain provinces 
of Canada are an example of countries that are open to direct foreign 
investment but restrictive in particular sectors. The policies may 
not grant extraordinary incentives to attract foreign investment nor 
do they discourage investments within certain sectors.
The mineral policy to attract foreign capital through negotiation 
(type 2) is based on the premise that the country has something of 
value to offer a foreign investor, and the investor can contribute 
something of value to the host economy.
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Other countries may use a mineral policy which is restrictive in 
certain key areas to protect certain domestic sectors from the control 
of foreign interests through investments. The designation of the 
critical areas, which is an important consideration, appears to be 
commonly based on clearly defined criteria which vary from one country 
to another. Most frequently excluded areas are banking, insurance, 
some parts of transportation and communication, and certain natural 
resources.
In the countries pursuing a restrictive policy, foreign capital 
is allowed only as a supplement to internal savings. Japan and 
Mexico appear to follow this policy.
There are certain ingredients which an ideal mineral policy 
should include as noted by Northcutt Ely, a noted authority in the 
field of international mineral legislation. This is herein noted as 
the model law for a mineral policy.
Types of Ownership
The administrative features and the ease with which they may be 
enforced are varied and are dependent upon the type of ownership which 
a foreign country wishes to establish by its mineral policy.
Possible ownership arrangements are (1) majority government 
ownership, (2) minority government ownership, and (3) total foreign 
private ownership (Mikesell, 1971).
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In the majority government ownership, the government usually 
retains total control or draws a management contract with a foreign 
investor.
In the minority government ownership, the government has (1) full 
exercise of voting rights in policy determinations and policy structure, 
or (2) a stable taxation policy and full exercise of ownership voting 
rights in policy determination, or (3) a stable taxation policy and no 
voting rights but full knowledge and participation in company policy 
decisions.
The total foreign private ownership may incorporate one or 
combinations of the following general policies. (1) Government is 
apt to change the tax schedules and regulate the industry closely.
(2) Government has long-term tax arrangements and exercises control 
over production, prices, etc. (3) Government has long-term tax 
arrangements and fixed, rather than changing, regulations.
Each type of ownership has its advantages and disadvantages from
//the viewpoint of the host government and the foreign investor. The 
host government, as the owner of the mineral resources, wants as much 
control as possible; but because of the need for financial aid, 
markets, and technical assistance, it must relinquish some control in 
order to attract the foreign investor. The foreign investor wants as 
little governmental interference as possible but, because governmental 
participation may offer more fair play in policy decisions affecting 
such things as taxation, it is advantageous to have the government 
participate in some form of partnership.
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It is not possible to indicate which type of ownership with 
resulting controls is the best for all situations due to the political 
climate, economic structure, and needs of the host government, the 
corporate structure and needs of the foreign investor, and the 
resultant conflicts.
As noted previously, there has been a change toward more govern­
mental participation, and the degree of participation may reflect the 
strength of the bargaining position of the host government, its long­
term development plans, and its competitive position regarding other 
countries with similar natural resource endowments.
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POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR MODEL MINERAL LAWS
Data used to indicate items which a model mineral policy should 
contain were drawn freely from ’’Policy Considerations in the Devel­
opment of Mineral Laws" (Ely, 1969).
The successfulness of mineral laws is measured by whether or not 
they result in the maximum economic recovery of the resource and 
maximum addition to the resource base of the host nations economy. This 
requires the attraction of large amounts of capital, and in the case of 
less developed countries, most of it from nondomestic sources. All 
capital is in competition with other alternative investment opportuni­
ties which could return high profits with less risk. J jlh e availability 
of foreign capital for mineral investments generally reflects the 
magnitude of the foreign consumers' demand for minerals.
The objective is to make the nation's mineral wealth work for its 
people, to supply their consumer requirements, to supply wealth to the 
economy, to generate revenues for the state, and to produce foreign 
exchange. This can be done by making the inherently risky mining 
business attractive to foreign capital and by competing for capital 
with businesses and other nations seeking this capital for development 
of their mineral resources.
The basic considerations for an effective mineral policy are 
statutes representing the interests of the state or host nation, the 
foreign investor or miner, and the consumer.
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State’s Interest
The state interest is that of a sovereign with complete power 
over the property within its boundaries whether owned by the state, 
by ita citizens, or by foreigners. The state's primary interest may 
be in providing a mineral or energy base for its own economy, in 
obtaining foreign exchange by developing its mineral resources, or 
in preserving the resources for future use, or in various combinations 
of these objectives. This power may be restricted by the state 
constitution or by agreements with other nations or by international 
law when negotiations are with foreign investors.
Certain general objectives common to most mineral policies are
(1) compensation for use of government lands; (2) maximum utilization
of the nation's resources through efficient mining and planning methods;
(3) development of a project that will provide both tax revenues as well
as foreign exchange; (4) use of capital in the areas most important to
the overall economic growth of the host country; (5) provide employment 
and training of the country's nationals; and (6) use of methods that 
would minimize air and water pollution, erosion, damage to the surface, 
etc.
Investor's Interest
The interests of the investor in a mining project, subdivided into 
reconnaissance, exploration, and production, are principally concerned 
with the security of tenure.| In each of these phases the length of 
time and amount of money required increases with respect to that 
required for the preceding stage.
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At the reconnaissance stage the investor would want the right to 
explore an area, preferably on an exclusive basis, of sufficient size 
and to select the more potential sections as indicated by data 
developed during preliminary exploration. Also the investor may want 
the right to import skilled labor and equipment into the country and 
return it without charges or duties. Some investors would want the 
right to keep data developed during reconnaissance confidential for a 
period of time.
If exploration were warranted because of the reconnaissance for 
mineral potential, the investor should be granted the following 
essential rights: (1) the exclusive right to occupy and explore for
minerals of interest in a specific area based on his own business and 
technical judgment operating within the framework of the host country’s 
law; and (2) if he discovers mineral, the exclusive right to develop 
and produce from the deposit on terms negotiated prior to making an 
investment for exploration.
At the production stage the principal rights required by the 
investor are (1) security of tenure long enough to recover the 
investment plus a profit proportionate to the risk and amount of 
investment required to find and develop the deposit; (2) the right 
to develop the deposit in accordance with his best interests and 
technical judgment; (3) the right to sell and dispose of the product;
(4) the right to repatriate capital, profits, and equipment; (5) the 
right of protection against unilateral changes in concession or 
contract terms, particularly relating to the state's financial demands;
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and (6) the right to an impartial court to decide disputes between 
the investor and the state.
Consumer’s Interest
Many times the rights of the consumer are not considered when a 
mineral policy is being drafted; often the consumer is affected by 
failure to implement regulations to control the fluctuations of prices 
or to maintain a steady flow of revenues from the exploitation of 
mineral resources. A law which requires high costs and taxes may 
eliminate the nation's mineral production from a competitive position 
in the international market. Conversely, a regulating system which 
requires the mines to produce and export at a fixed quantity regardless 
of economic considerations may decrease the total number of units in 
the deposit. The result may be overproduction followed by decreasing 
prices until the resource is depleted, at which time prices may increase 
due to a decrease in supply. The short-term interest of the consumer 
in surplus production and decreased prices should be weighed against the 
more reasonable long-range objective to assure the maximum efficient 
recovery of a depletable resource.
The interests of these three groups, state, investor, and 
consumer, can be represented by a policy allowing for effective 
administration, document of title, financial provisions, and settle­
ment of disputes.
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Administration--Unless an efficient administrative agency can 
be established, potential investors may be discouraged no matter how 
attractive the nation's mineral potential. In line of duty, the 
agency would have the official power to issue documents of title, 
keep records and maps in a workable system, grant import licenses 
for equipment, collect royalties and taxes, grant permits for repatri­
ation of capital and profits, etc. Therefore, the agency should be 
staffed with competent and trained people capable of dispatching the 
business within a reasonable period of time.
Document of Title--Documents of title establishing the rights of 
the investor may be issued separately for the reconnaissance, explo­
ration, and production stages, or the three stages may be covered by 
one document.
Although the most effective law may grant reconnaissance permits 
to almost any interested person, provided that he does not interfere 
with the surface rights of others, they can be exclusive setting aside 
areas for the interests of a particular party.
Exploration licenses may grant an exclusive right to occupy a 
stated area for a reasonable length of time and an exclusive right, 
if minerals are found, to a lease or concession to produce for a period 
of time specified in terms defined when the investment for development 
is first risked.
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If the state grants an exclusive right to occupancy to explore 
for minerals, it is entitled to demand that the holder should investi­
gate the potential and not hold the area for speculative purposes. 
Incentives to prevent this are to restrict the exploration license to 
a relatively short period with few renewals, to state the minimum 
requirements in the form of work and expenditures, to require payment 
of fixed royalties in advance to be credited to the operator when 
production starts, to relinquish fixed percentages of the area on each 
renewal, and to tax the surface area increasing the rate per unit in 
proportion to the number of units held and over time at each renewal 
date.
Production concessions should be automatically issued to the 
holder of an exploration license who makes a commercial discovery.
If the granted area is large, pressure should be applied to the 
concessionaire to develop or relinquish some area. Allowances should 
be made for the payment of a minimum royalty due to adverse market 
conditions, and not to force production if uneconomic or if it would 
cause oversupply resulting in a potential uneconomic situation. 
Duration of the concession should allow the investor to recover his 
investment plus profit; some countries grant allowances for renewal.
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Financial
Historically, the state's relationship with the mineral industry 
has been as a tax collector and royalty owner. Within recent years 
the trend is toward part ownership.
The tax burden on the extractive industry is assessed in almost
any imaginative form limited only by the ingenuity of politicians.
Taxes should be consolidated into a single tax on net income with some 
allowance to recognize that return of capital is part of the proceeds 
from a mine and not income. Some laws provide for this by allowing a
depletion deduction which is not subject to taxation.
Royalties, assessed either as a fixed amount of revenue per unit 
of production or as a percentage of the value of minerals produced, are 
the economic rent paid to the land owner for the privilege of working 
the mineral deposit. It is more equitable to assess the royalty 
payments on the value of the mineral production rather than as a fixed 
amount, since the fortunes of a price increase or adversity of poor 
economic conditions are shared by the owner of the property and do not 
place a burden upon the operator due to conditions over which he has 
no control.
Bonuses are usually paid to the landowner on the acquisition of 
title, when the property reaches production or in periodic payments 
during production. In some areas, particularly when bidding for petro­
leum exploration permits, acceptance of the bids is related to the 
quantity of bonus the investor is willing to provide.
T-1554 21
Recent mineral laws have seen the emergence of the state as a 
partner in a mineral operation. The percentage of state ownership 
varies; Mexico, for example, requires a 51 percent state or domestic 
ownership for all operations started after the ratification of the 
present mineral policy. Operations established prior to the enforce­
ment of the mineral policy must be converted to Mexican-majority 
ownership within 25 years.
Settlement of Disputes
Disputes frequently occur even in negotiations developed with the 
best of intentions; this is particularly so if the concession exists 
beyond the period of power of the governing power. Also there may be 
a tendency of the host government to initiate practices to intimidate 
the investor once the capital expenditures have been made in the 
development of the resource. The investor is vulnerable as his capital 
investment, once committed to finding and developing a deposit, is 
irreversible.
A mechanism should be provided in the mineral laws to allow 
settlement of the dispute in an equitable manner, preferably by 
arbitration by neutral parties. An equitable settlement is to the 
advantage of the host country as well as the investor because once 
the host country establishes a pattern of settlements inequitable to 
the investor who has fulfilled the requirements of the law, sources of 
foreign capital for investment will diminish.
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The policy choices of a country wishing to develop its mineral 
resources are varied and can be expressed in unlimited ways, but one 
variable prominent in the world's most successful policies is fair 
play. If rules need to be changed during the lifetime of a mineral 
operation, the investor and the host country should consider their 
obligations to society and obtain a settlement which is equitable to 
both parties in view of the current situation.
The mineral policies of Indonesia, Mexico, and Canada are 
analyzed as case studies indicating the diverse types of policies and 
the relative effectiveness of each policy.
T-1554 23
MINERAL POLICY OF INDONESIA
The initial mining industry of Indonesia started in 1816 with the 
exploration for tin; coal mining and petroleum activity started in 
1849. These three commodities were the most important sector of the 
Indonesian mining industry for several decades. The Law of 1907 formed 
the basic instrument for mining regulations until 1960. The 1907 law 
allowed mining through (1) a concession agreement granting the operator 
full control of the mining operation, disposal of the minerals, and the 
area covered by the agreement; and (2) a so-called 5a-contract between 
the Government and private entities in which the operator carried out 
exploration and/or development for the Government (Department of Mines - 
Republic of Indonesia, 1971).
The 1907 Mining Law was abolished in 1960 as it was deemed to be 
against the national interests of Indonesia. The 1960 law was revised
in 1967 and enacted under Law No. 11/1967 on the Basic Provisions of
Mining:
The basic philosophy underlying the present mining 
regime in Indonesia is that all minerals and mineral 
deposits are national assets, controlled by the State, 
and that they shall be utilized to the maximum benefit 
of the people. As such, in principle, mining is an 
exclusive business of the State. Under certain 
circumstances and terms and conditions the Government 
may authorize Government agencies as well as private
entities and individuals to carry out mining on
behalf of the State on the basis of a permit so-called
'Mining Authorization,1 to the extent the relevant 
mining activities cannot be conducted by the 
Government.
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The system of mining concession or lease as known in many 
countries has been abolished in Indonesia; mining by State enterprises, 
Indonesian enterprises or nationals, can be done only under an instru­
ment or contract--Authority to Mine--issued by the Ministry of Mines.
A foreign company using foreign capital can operate in the country only 
under a negotiated Contract to Work issued by the Government; the 
contract is negotiated for each separate mining venture.
The exploitation of mineral resources important to the State is 
limited to specific parties.
The mining of strategic minerals--petroleum, tin, copper, nickel, 
radioactive minerals, etc.--both in terms of their economics an^ State 
defense and security, is reserved to the State (Government Agency, or 
State Corporation). A foreign company using foreign capital qualifies, 
but prior to construction and development work the company must re­
organize under the laws of the Republic of Indonesia, thus becoming a 
State Corporation operating for the Government under imposed 
regulations.
The so-called vital minerals--gold, silver, lead, zinc, etc.--can 
be mined by a Government-appointed agency, a State Corporation, a 
Corporation of the Provincial Government, with or without private, 
national, or foreign interest.
The remaining minerals--clays, gypsum, limestones, etc.--are 
reserved for mining by the local population on a small scale under the 
guidance of the State.
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Application Procedure for Foreign 
Participation in Mining
The committee in charge of foreign participation in mining is 
Departemen Pertambangan (Ministry of Mines) Djalan Mentang Raya 3, 
Djakarta. Information on foreign investment in mining, all correspond­
ence, and negotiations for an Authorization to Mine are handled by this 
department. Those interested in mining must submit a request to the 
Ministry of Mines, indicating the mineral and area of interest. If 
the request is acceptable, the company may obtain data relating to 
geology and other reports in the interested area, as well as a letter 
of introduction to local authorities in which a desired reconnaissance 
may be made. All data obtained by the party during this period must 
be reported to the Ministry of Mines.
Data which must be submitted when an application is made for a 
Contract to Work are annual reports of activities and financial status 
of the business, evidence of their experience and qualifications, and 
other data so the Ministry of Mines can evaluate the applicant's 
financial or technical ability. If the application is accepted, a 
proposal of work will be drafted; and if the proposal is agreeable, 
it may result in a Contract to Work.
The Contract to Work agreement appoints the foreign company the 
sole contractor to the Government to conduct the exploration, develop­
ment, raining, processing, and marketing of the minerals, and performing 
all related activities. The company then assumes all risks, controls, 
and manages all activities, and has the right to mine, process, and 
market any and all minerals which may be discovered in the contract
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area unless these specific mineral rights are owned by others.
Contract Regulations
The agreement indicates the time periods allowed for stages of 
the work, rights and duties of the concerned parties, payments to the 
Government, and settlement of disputes.
Stages of Work— The Contract specifies the stages of work and 
time allotments for these stages as follows: general survey or
reconnaissance--12 months, exploration--36 months, evaluation--12 
months, construction--36 months, and operation--360 months. Extensions 
of up to 12 months for the general survey and 24 months for exploration 
may be granted. A break-in period or trial operation period of a 
maximum 6 months may precede the full production period of the oper­
ation. A size limitation of so many hectares may be assigned to each 
of these work stages.
Maximum processing of the minerals shall be done in Indonesia 
prior to export.
During the general survey, exploration and evaluation periods 
the company shall relinquish its rights and commitments on non­
potential parts of the area originally covered by the contract.
Financing--Prior to the start of construction and development, 
the company shall reorganize under the laws of the Republic of 
Indonesia* The company is required to demonstrate its capability to 
finance the project and must post bond or some form of security; also 
the company assumes sole responsibility for financing the project.
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The company shall open a foreign exchange account advising the 
Government periodically of foreign currency revenues and expenditures; 
company expenditures for equipment and services within the country 
shall be by domestic currency purchased by hard foreign currency; and 
foreign exchange obtained by sales in excess of that required for 
purchase of local currency to cover local expenditures may be held 
abroad by the company in a type of foreign exchange.
Company Commitments --The Government shall be responsible for 
relocating inhabitants within the mining area, but the company shall 
reimburse the inhabitants for dwellings, land, and other improvements 
in the contract area. Upon cessation of operations the land shall be 
restored to prevent undue erosion or destruction of surface features.
The company has the right to occupy the areas covered by the 
contract to explore, develop, and construct raining, processing, 
storage and transportation facilities necessary to bring the deposit 
into production. The company will comply with existing land use 
regulations and licensing, when building structures within and without 
the mining area necessary for developing the operation.
The Government shall be informed through quarterly progress 
reports. Within one year after the termination of the exploration 
stage a summary of its topographical, geological, geophysical, raining, 
ore dressing, and metallurgical investigations, including sample maps, 
logs, etc., shall be furnished to the Government. Certain of these 
data, all of which the Government has title to, will be treated as 
strictly confidential at the request of the company.
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The company or its representatives may bring into Indonesia 
employees with special skills which do not exist within the country. 
Indonesians shall be trained so that within 5 years after operation 
starts, at least 75 percent of all positions in each classification 
category are held by Indonesian nationals. Equal treatment and 
opportunities shall be accorded to all employees with the company, 
having the right in selection, assignment, and dismissal within terms 
set forth by the Government.
During the company's activities within the country domestic 
materials and services shall be employed as much as possible.
The contract shall be in effect for a period of 30 years after 
production has started and is renewable by mutual agreement of the 
company and the Government. The company may, because of uneconomic 
or other unfavorable conditions, suspend the operation in part or 
entirety after consultation with the Government. If the company 
defaults on any binding provision of the contract, it shall have a 
180-day period after notification to correct such default; the 
correction period may be lengthened if it is impossible to correct the 
default in the shorter period of time. If the default relates to 
monetary payments, the company has a 30-day period in which to correct 
the situation.
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Disputes which cannot be settled through mutual agreement shall 
be referred to a Board of Arbitration consisting of three members, 
two arbitrators, and an umpire. One arbitrator is selected by each 
party and the umpire is appointed by the arbitrators. The parties 
shall agree to abide by the arbitration judicated by the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment disputes if said disputes cannot be 
settled by mutual agreement.
Revenues to the Host Country--Revenues to Indonesia are in the 
form of land rents in the contract area, royalties upon production 
of the minerals, sales, taxes, and a documentary stamp duty tax 
upon the application.
Land rent rates differ, dependent upon the stage of work and 
type of deposit. During the reconnaissance stage the payment is 
due annually based on $0,005 (U.S.) per hectare, whereas during the 
exploration, evaluation, and construction periods the rate is 
$0.10 (U.S.) per hectare. During the production period, if the 
deposit is a lode or an alluvial type, the rate is $2.00 (U.S.) 
per hectare; the rate is $1.00 per hectare for lateritic and other 
extensive surface deposits.
Royalties for the various minerals are shown in Table 1.
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TABLE 1. - Royalty Rates of Selected Minerals 
Mined in Indonesia, U.S. Dollars
Mineral
Per kilogram 
of element in 
mineral or ore
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Source: Ministry of Mines, Foreign Participation in
Mining in Indonesia, 1967-1970, (1970).
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A corporation or income tax is levied on the basis of the 
company's taxable profit; the tax rates as per Presidential 
Instruction No. 18, 1968, are in Table 2. As indicated, there 
is some leniency during the first 10 years versus remaining years 
of operation.
There are no import duties on equipment required for the 
operation, and this equipment can be exported free of duty or sold 
in Indonesia, with allowance for domestic regulations regarding 
customs and import laws and regulations.
Effectiveness of the Indonesian Mineral Policy
Indonesia's mineral policy, as written, appears to incorporate 
all the fundamental requirements of the model minerals law advanced 
by Northcutt Ely. The country retains the ownership of the natural 
resources, granting, by means of a contract, a foreign investor the 
right to explore and develop the mineral deposits. The future welfare 
of the nation is protected by allotting the development of strategic 
minerals to companies organized under laws of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Host industrial minerals can be mined only by Indonesian nationals.
Although tenure is guaranteed for 30 years and can be extended 
by mutual consent, specific time periods are stated for stages of work 
involving reconnaissance, exploration, and development. This provision 
eliminates holding of mineral potential lands for indefinite time 
periods. Also taxes are levied per unit of area covered by the 
contract which encourages the relinquishment of low-mineral potential 
land.
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TABLE 2. - Corporation Tax Rates in Indonesia, Percent
_________Tax rate_________
Year 1 Year 11
























Source: Ministry of Mines, Foreign Participation in
Mining in Indonesia, 1967-1970, (1970).
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Taxes are based on profits--not value of production-allowing the 
investor and the host country to share in the risk due to price 
fluctuations and unexpected operating difficulties.
The Indonesian mineral policy exhibits qualities of a type which 
desires to attract foreign capital but on negotiated terms. Total 
foreign capital is used to develop the industry under terms specified 
in a contract for each operation.
Allowances are included for the settlement of disputes, but 
because of the relative newness of the current government it is 
difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the mineral policy in this 
report.
Indonesia is forced to use total direct foreign investment 
because of the lack of domestic funds available for development of a 
mineral industry utilizing its large mineral potential.
The corporate tax schedule grants a reduced tax rate during the 
first 10 years of operation.
Since 1967 through 1969 six companies using foreign capital have 
negotiated for "Authority to Mine" contracts to produce from deposits 
of nickel, bauxite, and copper investing in excess of $600 million. 
Indications are that about 22 companies have applied for contracts to 
explore for various minerals (Ministry of Mines, 1970).
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MINERAL POLICY OF MEXICO
Records indicate mining began in Mexico before 1521; mining, 
milling, smelting, and refining have played an important role in 
the economic, social, and cultural life and development of the 
Nation.
The Mexican mining industry has been regulated by ten different 
sets of Mining Laws since the first regulations were formed in 1526. 
Currently, the mining industry is governed by Federal Legislation 
under the Mining Law of April 20, 1961 (Miranda, 1968).
Paragraph 4 of Article 27 of the Political Constitution of
the Mexican United States states:
The direct dominium of all of the natural resources 
of the continental shelf and the submarine shelves 
of the islands; of all the minerals and substances 
that occur in veins, horizontal veins, masses or 
deposits, constitute deposits whose nature is 
different from the components of the land, such as 
Minerals from which metals or metalloids used in 
industry are extracted; the deposits of precious 
stones, of rock salt, and the salt mines formed 
directly from marine waters; the products derived 
from the decomposition of rocks, when their 
exploitation requires subterranean work; the 
mineral or organic deposits susceptible of being 
used as fertilizers; the solid fuel minerals; 
petroleum and all solid, liquid or gaseous 
hydrogen carbides; and the space situated above 
the national territory in the extension and terms 
set by International Law belong to the nation.
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Many social reforms carried out during the last 50 years, have 
resulted in a more generalized distribution of land and wealth and 
may be responsible for Mexico's political, monetary, and social 
stability. Most of the mining interests prior to 1960 were owned by 
English, French, and American companies and individuals; few, if any, 
Mexicans owned stock or held important management positions in the 
companies.
Also many of the land concessions having mineral potential were 
being held for future consideration and not being actively explored.
The decision to industrialize the Mexican economy opposed the 
interests of the foreign-owned and foreign-controlled companies which 
were mining, exploring, producing, and processing the minerals for 
export and further beneficiation and fabrication outside Mexico.
The establishment of regulations which discouraged domestic and 
foreign exploitation of mineral resources during the 1950's resulted 
from the following considerations (1) an effort to change the attitude 
of the foreign investors to industrialize the minerals within Mexico, 
(2) a reliance upon markets of raw materials supplied to foreign 
nations with associated fluctuating prices, (3) the shift of national 
interests to other elements of the economy such as agriculture, and 
(4) the attitude that the mining industry was dangerously depleting 
nonrenewable natural resources.
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Taxes such as property, income, production, and export taxes on 
minerals and mineral products were increased. Minerals such as 
phosphates, sulfur, and potassium or specified mineralized areas were 
declared to be national reserves to be mined under special conditions 
preferably by Mexican nationals. Investments were greatly reduced and 
new mining ventures were few. The mining industry, once a major 
contributor to the economy and social structure of the nation, was 
reduced in importance and prestige.
In 1958, measures considered to revitalize the mining industry 
included nationalization, Mexicanization, or tax relief for the 
benefit of the foreign owners together with Mexican acceptance of a 
secondary role. Mexicanization was adopted in which Mexican 
nationals own 51 percent of the operation.
Some of the mineral resources may be classified, because of 
importance to the nation, as national mining reserves either by 
commodity or area. All placer ores and commodities such as atomic 
materials and others used for nuclear reactors, commodities essential 
for industrial development of the country, and some mineralized areas 
placed in the National Mining Reserve may be exploited by government 
mining entities, by companies with government participation, or by 
private enterprises under special concessions. Commodities or areas 
not open to exploitation are reserves set aside for future supply of 
the country.
Concessions are granted for mining, beneficiation, and special 
concession for exploiting National Mining Reserves.
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Application Procedure for Foreign 
Participation in Mining
As of July 1968 there were as many as 37 mining agencies in 
Mexico, and application for concessions are filed with the appropriate 
agency. Data required when applying for a mining concession are 
location, status, and description of the area to be included; name of 
the company and its origin, size of the area; substances to be 
exploited; and proof of the financial and technical capabilities of 
the company. This application is then forwarded to the Ministry of 
National Patrimony which has the authority of approval. Approval 
consists of a certification allowing the applicant separately or 
jointly with professional personnel to enter the area to perform work 
permitted by the Mining Law, its regulations, or special orders from 
the Ministry of National Patrimony. The Law provides that only 
Mexican nationals and companies organized in accordance with Mexican 
law and those which have the majority of their capital subscribed by 
Mexicans may obtain concessions.
Concession Regulations
This particular mineral policy requires participation of Mexican 
nationals at a ratio of 51 percent or greater, depending upon the type 
of concession. Although existing foreign operators had 25 years within 
which to Mexicanize, the operation incentives are provided to quicken 
the changeover to the requirements of the Mining Law. The concessions 
are (1) common concession for mining, (2) special concession for mining, 
and (3) a concession for beneficiation.
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Common-Mining Concession--Upon approval of the concession, the 
applicant has 60 days within which to construct the claim corners, and 
pay for the stamps for the concession title and a title fee for 
registering in the Mining Public Registry. Mining concessions lapse 
for failure to pay surface taxes, to perform and prove the required 
assessment work within the allotted time, and to acquire the prescribed 
Mexican ownership in the case of a company. Allowances are made due to 
uncontrollable economic or technical reasons at the discretion of the 
controlling government agency.
Each concession covers a single mining claim of 500 hectares 
(1,235.5 acres) maximum and may be requested for a maximum of eight 
different substances. If different substances are found, the substance 
may be added to the concession, provided it is not in the national 
mineral reserves. Only the authorized substances may be explored for, 
extracted, beneficiated, and used.
Surface areal limitations for the various commodities are: 
coal--8,000 hectares; sulfur, manganese, tin and sodium and potassium 
salts--4,000 hectares; gold, silver, lead, copper, zinc, gypsum, 
barite, fluorite, silica, iron, titanium, antimony, graphite, 
diatomaceous earth, refractory earth, phosphoric rock, kaolin, and 
bauxite--3,000 hectares; and mercury, tungsten, molybdenum, and other 
substances not enumerated--1,000 hectares. When common concessions 
cover substances in different surface groups, the total area is 
computed separately for each group. The surface area of the 
concessions is computed for 33 percent of their surface during the
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exploration period of 5 years, in the course of which the area of 
concession is reduced to the maximum allowable, dependent upon the 
commodity. During the exploration period, the operator shall notify 
the Ministry of National Patrimony each year of the exploration 
accomplished and the areas relinquished.
Time period of a common mining concession is 25 years and may be 
indefinitely extended if during the last 3 years of the initial period 
the operator has complied with the regulations.
Rights of the operator or owner of a mining concession are
(1) to have access to the area covered by the concession for explora­
tion and exploitation; (2) to construct necessary facilities to mine 
and beneficiate the resource; (3) to carry out, except in coal mines, 
underground connections across assigned or concessioned land to the 
surface to improve the economics of extracting ore, to remove water, 
or to ventilate the mining operation; (4) to acquire easements 
required for the development of the concessions in the judgment of 
the Ministry of National Patrimony; (5) to use available water from 
the mining concession or surplus water from other sources if necessary; 
and (6) to have preferential rights to concessions on open fractions 
between the concession and adjoining land.
This type of a concession can be obtained only by Mexican 
nationals and Mexican companies of which Mexican nationals own not 
less than 51 percent of the capital.
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Special-Mining Concession--Special-mining concessions are issued 
on a competitive bidding basis for the exploitation of minerals 
classified as National Mining Reserves. The owners of the special 
mining concession have the same rights and obligations as the owners 
of the common mining concessions. The application listing the greatest 
advantage for the economic and industrial development of the region and 
country, including the best technical and economic proposals, is granted 
the concession.
This type of a concession can be obtained only by Mexican 
nationals or by companies organized in accordance with Mexican law 
and in which 66 percent of the corporate capital is owned by Mexican 
nationals.
Beneficiation-Plant Concession--Beneficiation plants are defined 
as industrial complexes and their accompanying facilities which 
mechanically or metallurgically treat national or foreign mineral 
substances. This includes smelting and refining operations to produce 
concentrates and metallic compounds, metals, metalloids, or nonmetallic 
minerals which may be used by other industries. Concessions for 
installation and operation of beneficiation plants are issued by the 
Ministries of National Patrimony and Industry and Commerce to owners 
of mining concessions and to government mining companies. Plants with 
a capacity less than 100 tons of ore per day do not require a 
concession.
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Beneficiation plants are divided into two classes, those for 
private service and those for public service. Private service plants 
must process a maximum of 15 percent of ores produced by the public 
at rates set by the Ministries of Finance and Public Credit, of 
Industry and Commerce, and of National Patrimony. Public service 
plants process ores from many sources similar to U.S. plants treating 
custom ores.
The concessions are granted for 25 years, renewable for an 
indefinite period of time provided that the concessionaire has 
complied with the required regulations during the last 3 years of the 
initial 25-year period.
Obligations of the concessionaire are (1) to start and finish 
construction and provide services on the set dates; (2) to advise the 
Ministries of National Patrimony and of Industry and Commerce of any 
suspension of operations; (3) to operate efficiently and maintain the 
plant in good condition; (4) to discard wastes from the process on 
lands contained in the concession and discharge liquid wastes free of 
dangerous substances; and (5) to present data to the government upon 
request and allow periodic government inspection.
Organization of Mining Companies
Mexican national participation in the mining companies is through 
the issue of stocks of which 51 percent must be owned by Mexican 
nationals for common concessions, and 66 percent must be owned by 
Mexican nationals for special concessions.
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The company must be registered with the appropriate government 
agencies indicating the ownership of the corporation; if the percent 
ownership by Mexican nationals becomes less than the minimum required 
for Mexicanization and is not corrected within a stated period of time,
punitive action is started by the government.
If the management of a company is by one individual, he must be 
a Mexican. If the management is by a board, the majority of the 
members must be Mexican.
Revenues to the Host Country
Major revenues collected from the foreign investor in a mining 
concession are through production, export, and income taxes, and 
imposition of import duty on equipment and material. Other revenues 
are a portion of the profits realized on a prorated basis because of 
the Mexican ownership.
The production tax is based upon a certain percentage of the 
official value of the taxed products; the rate depends upon the degree 
of processing within the country. The rate decreases as the product is 
further processed; the purpose is to encourage mining companies to 
treat and process the ore in Mexico, and thus provide employment of 
domestic labor.
Also the tax increases as the price of the commodity increases, 
and decreases as the price of the commodity decreases. A basic price 
per unit is set by the government to obtain the value of the commodity;
the basic price is then adjusted by an official unit price which
closely follows the New York market quotations.
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The export tax is levied on any mineral product which is exported 
from Mexico. The tax rate depends upon the stage of refinement; it is 
higher for crude ore and lower for refined metal. The amount of export 
tax is based on the official value of metal content of the product.
The combined production and export taxes (ad valorem) and the 
official values of some minerals as of 1968 are shown in Table 3.
The income tax and import duties are equivalent to those of the 
various other industries.
Foreign Investment Incentives
Tax reductions are granted to Mexican owned and Mexicanized 
mining companies; a reduction which applies may be one of these two:
(1) an automatic 50 percent reduction in the export and production tax;
(2) a minimum of 50 percent to a maximum of 75 percent reduction in 
export and production taxes. The latter tax reduction is limited to 
small or medium-sized producers.
In addition, another special tax reduction is granted to Mexican 
nationals and Mexicanized companies exploring and developing mining 
concessions in less developed areas with related problems of accessi­
bility, or concessions with low-grade ores or special inherent 
exploitation problems.
Special tax agreements resulting in a 100-percent reduction of 
production and export taxes for a given period of time in addition to 
a maximum of 40 percent reduction in income taxes for a maximum of 
5 years may be obtained.
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TABLE 3. - Combined Production and Export Taxes on 
Certain Minerals Mined in Mexico, 1968
Official value
per unit Ad valorem
Mineral____________________ (Mexican currency)______rate, percent
Copper ores 12.42 net kilo 26.75
Copper concentrates or 
precipitates 13.41 net kilo 26.20
Copper (refined) 14.63 net kilo 27.50
Tin ores 40.24 net kilo 25.00
Tin concentrates 38.47 net kilo 25.00
Sulfur (natural ore,
foundried, precipitated) 501.86 gross ton 25.00
Iron in natural minerals .097 net kilo 25.00
Lead ores 2.21 32.00
Lead in amounts of more than
1,000 kms. by RR from any
smelter or mill 2.21 26.90
Source: Miranda (1968).
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Generally, the companies are required to invest these tax gains 
in exploration, roads, machinery, and equipment.
Effectiveness of the Mexican Mineral Policy
The stated objective of the Mexican mineral policy was to use the 
nation’s natural resources to develop the domestic economy, primarily 
through industrialization. The natural resources were to be developed 
by Mexican nationals or through concessions granted to companies in 
which Mexican nationals owned 51 percent of the operation.
This type of policy is restrictive as related to direct foreign 
investment, not only regarding ownership but also the type of minerals 
which could be mined by the foreign participating companies.
It follows closely the principles outlined in the model mineral 
law and might be considered a forerunner in a direct participation 
policy versus expropriation.
The Mexicanization of the sulfur industry in 1966 was preceded 
by export quotas and regulations requiring increased exploration to 
enlarge the reserve base. The Mexicanization policy was implemented 
because of nationalistic political pressures and the desire to 
establish an industrial economy. During the Mexicanization procedure 
there were many international accusations directed toward Mexico 
because of the international trade of sulfur and the short supply 
situation. Mikesell (1971, p. 297-311) affords an excellent 
explanation.
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By offering tax reductions and subsidies, the government 
encourages Mexicanization of the mineral industry. Also by increasing 
the production and export taxes on raw materials versus refined 
materials, the government encourages the construction of processing 
facilities within the nation, thus employing domestic labor. The 
special tax incentives encourage the development of marginal low-grade 
ores and establishment of a mineral industry in remote areas providing 
employment and transportation networks.
Mexicanization leaves the control of the industry with Mexican 
nationals and allows the host country to voice some control over the 
destiny of the use of their national heritage--the natural resources.
At the same time foreign investors are attracted by the mineral 
potential of the country, the tax incentive provided to Mexicanize 
their holdings, and the political stability of the government.
The changes in the value of the mineral production, the produc­
tion and consumption of specific metals, and the export of these 
metals provide an indication of the growth of the mineral industry 
and industrialization of the economy. Value and production would 
indicate indirectly the attraction of foreign capital to develop the 
resources, but a decrease in export of raw materials would indicate 
progress in industrialization.
The value of mineral production increased from 3.4 billion pesos 
in 1957 to 6.2 billion pesos in 1971— an 82 percent increase (Table 4).
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TABLE 4. - Value of Mexico^ Metallic and Nonmetallic Mineral
Production, 1957-1971, million pesos
Metallic
















Source: Annuario Estadistico de la Mineria Mexicana
1963, 1967, 1970, and 1971 editions. Consejo de Recursos 
Naturales No Renovables, Sumario Estadistico de la Mineria 
Mexicana, Departmento de Estudios Economicos. Various 
pages.
Estadisticos Minerometalurgica Production 
Exportacion. 1968-1969, Secretaria de Industrio y Comercio. 
Direccion General de Estadistica.
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The production of copper increased from 60.7 thousand tons in 
1957 to 63.2 thousand tons in 1971--a 4.1 percent increase (Table 5). 
Domestic refinery production increased 90 percent. The most significant 
indicator is the increased consumption of 38.3 thousand tons from 1957 
to 1971--an increase of 250 percent. Also, the exports of refined metal 
declined 8.6 thousand tons or a 2,870 percent decrease.
Although similar data for lead show a decrease in mine production, 
consumption of refined lead has increased 230 percent and exports have 
decreased about 140 percent (Table 6).
These data indicate that the process of industrialization 
requiring more processing and domestic use of copper and lead metal 
within the nation has been successful.
Though received initially with some misgivings, the policy of 
Mexicanization met with an encouraging response from foreign mining 
companies because of the prospect of important tax reliefs.
There is no shortage of foreign capital in Mexico; it is rather 
the lack of total investment that is a cause for concern to the 
government, which is presently attempting to alleviate the problem 
by a series of tax reforms and measures now before Congress and 
designed to step up productivity and public investment (Mining Journal, 
1972m, p. 21-22).
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TABLE 5. - Salient Statistics of Copper Production and
Consumption in Mexico, 1957-1971, metric tons
Mine Consumption Exports of
production, Smelter Refinery of refined refined
Year copper content production production copper copper
1957 60,700 59,000 27,600 15,300 8,900
1958 65,000 62,000 27,700 19,600 8,200
1959 57,300 54,700 29,300 17,400 13,200
1960 60,300 51,700 28,200 19,800 6,300
1961 49,300 42,000 26,700 19,600 3,400
1962 47,100 52,000 30,600 22,1009 5,000
1963 55,100 50,000 30,700 29,500 2,800
1964 52,100 48,300 34,900 32,000 600
1965 55,200 47,200 46,400 36,100 800
1966 56,500 51,300 47,500 30,100 300
1967 56,000 50,200 47,100 34,200 -
1968 61,100 52,500 51,500 56,000 100
1969 66,200 56,600 57,000 64,900 100
1970 61,000 59,600 53,700 54,000 600
1971 63,200 61,900 52,600 53,600 300
Source: Metallgesellschaft Aktiengellschaft. Metal Statistics,
1967, 54th Annual Issue. Frankfurt Am Main: p. 193.
Metallgesellschaft Aktiengellschaft. Metal Statistics, 
1972, 59th ed: Frankfurt Am Main, p. 209.
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TABLE 6. - Salient Statistics of Lead Production and Consumption













1957 214,900 200,900 28,200 155,800
1958 201,900 195,700 25,500 143,400
1959 190,700 189,000 26,200 136,100
1960 190,700 166,700 29,800 131,600
1961 190,000 190,400 37,600 150,500
1962 193,300 181,600 47,500 123,500
1963 190,000 182,300 56,200 124,400
1964 174,800 170,000 62,100 93,400
1965 169,700 172,400 71,000 96,700
1966 182,100 181,800 69,600 98,600
1967 163,900 168,400 76,200 83,900
1968 174,200 180,300 86,500 82,000
1969 170,900 175,900 99,200 73,000
1970 176,600 180,300 94,300 77,600
1971 156,900 158,800 93,200 67,300
Source: Metallgesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft. Metal Statistics,
1967, 54th Annual Issue: Frankfurt Am Main, p. 136.
Metallgesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft. Metal Statistics, 
1972, 59th ed.: Frankfurt Am Main, p. 150.
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"One problem that Mexicanization has brought," one Mexican mining 
expert explained, "is that some investments are held up because of the 
difficulty in finding Mexico's 51 percent of the money. The foreign 
49 percent is more than available, but Mexico's limited domestic 
resources are still attracted by higher profits in the manufacturing 
sector" (Pay Dirt, 1971, p. 14).
The Mexicanization of Anaconda's large Cananea copper mine in 
Sonora late in August 1971 marks the completion of a 25-year process 
to place the country's mining sector in Mexican hands.
Today 98.7 percent of mining production comes from companies with 
at least 51 percent Mexican ownership. The remaining mines are too 
small and unprofitable to be of interest to the Mexican government.
Ironically, Mexicanization, which seemed an extreme measure when 
it began in the 1940's following the 1938 nationalization of the 
Mexican oil industry, is now seen as guaranteeing foreign raw materials.
The completion of Mexicanization has consequently brought about a 
sharp increase in investment in the mining sector as foreign interests 
recognize the difference between this policy of "institutionalized 
nationalization" and the nationalization in parts of South America.
Since 1961, Anaconda has been seeking a method of Mexicanizing 
the Cananea operation without adversely affecting Anaconda's financial 
investment in the property. The principal problem was the shortage of 
Mexican capital available to purchase a majority interest in the 
property (Anaconda Co., 1971, p. 9).
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The management of The Anaconda Co. asked the Mexican government 
to nationalize the Cananea property as "there will be better possibili­
ties of increasing our production and expanding our installations if we 
are associated with Mexican interests."
Upon sale of the majority equity interest, Anaconda retains a 49 
percent interest in Cananea, with the right to name seven of the 15 
members of Cananea's board of directors. Technical assistance in 
mining and metallurgical operations and processes provided by Anaconda 
will be on a cost-reimbursement basis.
Changes in the Mineral Policy
The law, effective in 1970, required mining firms that included 
smelter and mines in population areas having more than 100 employees 
to provide housing or an equivalent allowance. Any employer operating 
more than 3 kilometers from a town must also provide housing (Ashley, 
1969, p. 497).
Except for technical and professional employees that may not be 
available, 90 percent of the labor force must be Mexican.
A bill "To Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign 
Investment" is now before the Mexican Congress for consideration 
during the first quarter of 1973.
The foreign investment bill is new and its details have not been 
widely known except that it is the intent of the Mexican government 
to limit foreign investment to no more than 49 percent of any new 
enterprises. This is not a change from the Mexicanization program
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in which 51 percent of the equity interest must be owned by Mexican 
nationals and the majority of the board of directors must be Mexican 
nationals (Long, 1973, p. IE and 6E)»
The American investors do not want the Mexicanization policy to 
apply to middle-management level dealing with administrative and 
technical functions where there appears to be a shortage of Mexicans 
willing to devote their talents to American firms.
The proposed new law would establish categories of activities 
in which foreign investment is welcome and would establish ground 
rules for the prospective foreign investor.
Guidelines for foreign investment to be desirable are (1) it must 
complement and not displace domestic capital in Mexico; (2) it should 
seek new fields of action and not those already covered by domestic 
capital; (3) it should associate with Mexican capital, with control 
resting in the Mexican interest; and (4) it should give preference to 
the employment of Mexican citizens wherever possible.
Mexico's foreign-investment philosophy is that Mexico favors 
foreign investment, but only in fields and ways that are advantageous 
to Mexico.
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In a recent publication Campillo Saenz, Mexican Undersecretary
of Commerce, was quoted as follows:
Mexico now looks down a new road that will make 
our nation more independent and give greater 
freedom to all Mexicans. Foreign capital can be 
a useful complement to accelerate our process of 
development but must conform to the new goals we 
have set for ourselves. It must among other 
requirements associate with Mexican capital on a 
minority basis as a general rule, give preference 
to Mexican citizens in the employment of technical 
experts and administrative personnel, provide 
advanced technology and produce export goods that 
can also be sent to foreign investors1 markets.
(Pay Dirt, 1973, p. 14.)
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MINERAL POLICY OF CANADA
The Canadian mineral laws are predicated on the British common 
law concepts in which mineral rights were connected with the surface 
rights; hence many mineral deposits are privately owned. Conversely 
the Spanish concept, based on the Regalion Law, separates the mineral 
rights from the surface rights, retaining the minerals as the property 
of the state or the people. Early mining laws in Canada granted the 
discoverer of a mineral deposit the mineral rights on his staking and 
recording the claim; rights to the claims could be retained by per­
forming periodic assessment work. Title to the claim containing the 
mineral deposit and surface land could be subsequently acquired. The 
right to a mineral title has been replaced by a right to lease in 
which the mineral title is separated from the surface title. The 
leasing system for metallic, nonmetallic, and fossil fuels is designed 
after those governing petroleum.
Titles to minerals on public lands are administered by the 
Provincial governments, except in the Northwest Territories, the 
Yukon, and lands of the Indian reserves and National Parks where title 
is held by the Federal Government. Each of the 10 Provincial govern­
ments has its own mineral laws regarding mineral rights, conservation, 
taxation and royalties, operating and safety rules, and other controls 
on the mineral industries. In addition, there are Federal laws which 
apply to the mineral activities in the province.
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Within the last few years there has been much criticism of the 
tax incentives favoring the mining industry and the foreign control 
of the Canadian mineral industry. Consequently, some laws have been 
changed regarding taxation, and other laws are being proposed to 
decrease the control of foreign investors.
Application Procedure for Foreign 
Participation in Mining
As a general rule, any individual 18 years old and any company 
authorized to do business in Canada may acquire rights to minerals on 
Crown lands in all provinces and territories. Exceptions to this are 
the Northwest Territories where leases may be secured only by Canadian 
citizens or companies incorporated in Canada with 50 percent Canadian 
ownership or with specified opportunities for Canadian participation.
Control over the natural resources in Canada is largely a matter 
of provincial jurisdiction. Although the pertinent Acts in force in 
the various provinces are enactments of provincial legislatures, 
several Federal Statutes have a direct effect on mining, oil, and 
natural gas enterprises.
These Statutes are (1) Canada Corporation Act; (2) National 
Energy Board Act; (3) Atomic Energy Control Act; (4) Regional Develop­
ment Incentives Act; (5) Emergency Gold Mining Assistance Act; (6)
Cape Breton Development Corporation Act; (7) Coal Production Assistance 
Act; (8) Canadian Coal Equality Act; and (9) Atlantic Provinces Power 
Development Act.
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With the exception of the Atomic Energy Act that places control 
of production and sale of radioactive material with the Atomic Energy 
Control Board, the remaining Acts provide government assistance for 
mineral resource production (Hodgson and Bears, 1969).
The Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources administers the 
Federal laws of general application throughout Canada; the department 
performs geological surveys, investigates mines and mineral deposits, 
and publishes statistics and maps. In addition, the National Energy 
Board, Atomic Energy Control Board, and Dominion Coal Board have some 
important controls concerning mineral development.
Because of the variation in the mineral laws of the provinces and 
territories in Canada only those of British Columbia will be illus­
trated (Ely, 1970).
Mineral Laws of British Columbia
Mineral rights are obtained through a leasing system which 
separates surface and underground rights.
Before a person can prospect for, locate, and record mineral 
rights he must acquire a Free Miner's Certificate. There is no limit 
to the number of claims which can be located; size of the claims may 
not exceed 51.65 acres (1,500 feet by 1,500 feet). Claims must be 
recorded within 15 to 30 days of staking and can be held as long as 
annual work worth $100 is performed, or an annual payment of $100 in 
lieu of annual work is made. Up to 40 claims may be worked as a unit.
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After $500 of assessment work has been completed, or a payment of 
$500 in lieu of work, and survey of the claim, the holder may apply 
for a certificate of improvement and a mineral lease. A lease has a 
time limit of 21 years and is subject to annual rental payments and 
assessment work, both based on an acreage basis.
The Placer-Mining Act of 1960 provides laws concerning the 
location of minerals occurring in natural unconsolidated material. 
There are three types of placer claims: (1) creek diggings, (2) bar
diggings, and (3) dry diggings. Leases of up to 80 acres are granted 
for terms not exceeding 20 years.
Revenues to the Host Country
The principal sources of revenue are obtained through income, 
excise, and custom taxes.
The Federal income tax laws impose the largest tax burden on the 
mineral industry--18 percent of the first $35,000 and 47 percent in 
excess of $35,000; this is in addition to provincial mining, social 
services, property, income, and various minor tax levies.
Excise tax is 12 percent, with certain exceptions, on the value 
of all goods produced or manufactured in Canada, or imported into 
Canada.
The customs tariff applies mainly to mining equipment and 
machinery which are imported but could have been purchased from 
Canadian firms manufacturing similar equipment.
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Royalties on mineral production may be levied, but to date 
only a royalty on iron ore has been imposed. All mining companies 
are assessed a provincial net income tax of 15 percent after the 
first $10,000 income. An acreage tax is imposed on Crown granted 
claims when less than $200 annual development work per claim is done.
Foreign Investment Incentives
Tax reduction allowances are depreciation, depletion, and an 
exemption from taxation during the first 3 years of mine production. 
Changes have been made in the depletion and tax-exempt regulations.
As of January 1972, the depletion allowance for most minerals has been 
changed from 33-1/3 percent of profits as long as the property has been 
in production, to Canadian $1 in depletion allowance for every Canadian 
$3 expended for prospecting, development, mining, and processing. The 
tax-free 3 -year exemption regulation expires in 1974.
The Provincial governments often construct the transportation 
facilities--highways and railroads--to the property of the mining 
operations. Although the mining industry may be the greatest benefac­
tor, the transportation network does provide access to remote areas 
which otherwise may not be opened to other industries such as lumber­
ing and agriculture.
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Effectiveness of the Canadian Mineral Policy
Initially the prime purpose of the Canadian mineral policy was 
to develop the nation’s mineral resources, with the obtaining of the 
necessary capital investment, technical assistance, related marketing 
facilities, and foreign exchange through exports. For the fulfillment 
of these objectives, the policy provided incentives, principally in 
the form of tax reductions to attract foreign capital, technology, and 
the related marketing facilities. Other items influencing the invest­
ment were the potential of a mineral industry previously demonstrated 
in the lower "48" states of the United States in the North American 
Cordillera which extends through Canada into Alaska, the political 
stability of the government, and the nearness to the United States 
and Japanese markets.
The type of mineral policy relating to direct foreign investment 
in Canada ranges from open to restrictive because each Province and 
Territory establishes its own mineral laws. Any company authorized 
to do business in Canada may acquire mineral title to public and most 
private lands; mineral titles are granted independently from surface 
rights in all parts of Canada. Exceptions to the rule are the 
Northwest Territories where leases may be held only by Canadian 
citizens or companies incorporated in Canada with 50 percent Canadian 
ownership.
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In British Columbia, for which data will be used to measure the 
effectiveness of the mineral policy in terms of capital expenditures 
on the mineral industry and value of mineral production, the type 
policy is open with minor restrictions. The restrictions are age 
requirements of the person locating a claim and the size of the 
claims.
From 1965 to 1970 the expenditures in British Columbia for 
exploration and development for minerals, including oil and gas, 
increased from $105.8 to $302.4 million, a 187 percent increase.
Except for oil and gas, the increase was from $56.7 to $237.6 million, 
a 320 percent increase (Table 7).
The value of mineral production, including fuels, increased from 
$179.8 million in 1961 to $469.3 in 1970, a 152 percent increase. 
Excluding fuels (except coal) the increase was from $166.9 to $374 
million, a 124 percent increase (Table 8).
Benefits of the mining industry to the local economy were the 
construction of 193 miles of public roads from 1966 through 1970 
at a cost of $8.1 million plus $4.3 million for maintenance costs. 
These roads, including those constructed in past years, have been of 
significant value in providing access to outlying regions of the 
Province for settlement and for tourism and recreational purposes 






Year Oil and gas Other Total
1965 49.1 56.7 105.8
1966 55.9 70.5 126.4
1967 67.8 57.7 125.5
1968 62.6 108.4 171.0
1969 65.9 134.0 199.9
1970 64.8 237.6 302.4
Source: Price, Waterhouse & Co. (1971).
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TABLE 8. - Annual Value of Mineral Production in British 






1961 12.9 166.9 179.8
1962 29.1 195.5 224.6
1963 37.4 212.1 249.5
1964 38.1 219.4 257.5
1965 46.0 222.4 268.4
1966 56.8 260.2 317.0
1967 69.7 293.9 363.6
1968 87.9 285.1 373.0
1969 90.1 325.6 415.7
1970 95.3 373.9 469.2
Source: Price, Waterhouse & Co. (1971).
T-1554 64
Other expenditures were in the areas of transportation, grants 
and donations, welfare and community buildings, and research amounting 
to about $10.8 million in 1970 (Price, Waterhouse & Co., 1971).
In addition, there is the multiplier effect--that is, the 
re-spending of the mineral industry expenditures creating additional 
income and employment in British Columbia and other parts of Canada. 
The effect on the regional economy through the multiplier effect is 
contingent upon three factors: (1) the amount of the original 
expenditures within the region, (2) the propensity of the people to 
re-spend their earnings within the region, and (3) the propensity of 
the people within the region to deposit the money as savings.
In 1970 the expenditures of the British Columbia mining industry 
had an income effect of $550 million, about 6 percent of the gross 
provincial product. The number of workers directly employed by the 
mining industry was 14,850; in addition there were 35,000 employees 
in other industries supported by mining expenditures within the 
province or about 2.5 workers for each employee directly associated 
with the mining industry (Price, Waterhouse & Co., 1971).
For Canada as a whole the income effect of the British Columbia 
mining industry was $1.25 billion.
In addition to the 14,850 workers directly employed by the mining 
companies another 95,000 workers were employed by industries supported 
by the mining expenditures. Nation-wide, the mining industry in 
British Columbia supported seven other workers for each worker 
directly employed (Price, Waterhouse & Co., 1971).
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Changes in the Mineral Policy
Canada's geographic location, political history, and mineral 
policy make it an attractive country in which foreign investors are 
confident they will be fairly treated. However, the degree of con­
fidence can be changed by political inference as well as actions.
Some of the recent changes in the mineral policy that resulted 
from proposed government changes reported in 1971 were (1) withdrawal 
of the 3-year exemption for new mines, (2) fast write-off capital 
assets of new mines and major expansions of existing mines, (3) changes 
in the depletion allowance, (4) deduction for the cost of acquiring 
mining properties, (5) taxing the sale of mining properties, (6) deduc­
tion for exploration and development expenses by all taxpayers,
(7) deduction for foreign exploration and development expenses,
(8) different treatment of provincial mining taxes, and (9) withdrawal 
of prospectors and grubstakers blanket exemption (Macinnas, 1971).
The exemption of tax payments 3 years after the beginning of mine 
production allows early recapture of the capital investment on the 
basis of the theory of the time-value of money in computing the 
return-on-the investment. Opponents to the abolition of this tax 
incentive refer to the interest and activity of the mining industry 
in Erie, Ireland, which supposedly resulted after the 3-year tax 
holiday was incorporated into the Irish mineral policy.
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The provision for the fast write-off capital investment used for 
a new producing mine or a major expansion of an existing mine replaces 
the tax exemption law. Qualifying assets can be written off each year 
to the full extent of income from the new or expanded mine or 30 per­
cent of the undepreciated capital cost, whichever is greater, until 
the entire cost is recovered. The income will include that from 
processing ores to the prime metal stage or the equivalent. The 
expansion of an existing mine qualifies if the milling capacity is
,increased by 25 percent.
Types of assets eligible for the fast write-off are (1) buildings 
other than office buildings off the mine property; (2) mining equipment 
and machinery; (3) metal refineries; (4) access roads; and in the case 
of new mines only, airports and docks located off the mine property 
and capital expended for community housing and facilities.
The depletion allowance will be changed from 33-1/3 percent to $1 
depletion allowance for every $3 of eligible expenditures to a maximum 
of 33-1/3 percent of production profits in the particular year.
Reportedly, the type of expenditures which will be allowed for
calculating depletion are (1) capital assets which qualify for accel­
erated depreciation except airports, docks, and communities, and 
related facilities; (2) domestic exploration and development expenses 
excluding the cost of acquiring the property, cost of constructing the 
community and related facilities, cost of airports, docks, capitalized 
interest, and exploration and development after initial production 
starts; and (3) cost of new processing facilities constructed in
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Canada provided that they are an integral part of the new mine or 
expansion and the processing would otherwise be done outside Canada.
Any expenditures made after November 7, 1969, qualify.
The effect of the new depletion rules is that once the accumula­
tion of earned depletion is used, eligible expenditures equal to 
one-half of production profits must be incurred in the year in order
to maintain a 33-1/3 percent depletion allowance.
There will be no shareholders ’ depletion allowance after 
December 31, 1971.
After December 31, 1971, the cost of acquiring mining properties, 
rights, or interests will be treated as exploration and development 
expenses and will be deductible within prescribed annual limits.
After 1971 the proceeds and not the profit from the sale of a 
mining property will be taxed. The provisions in the proposal are the 
proceeds from the sale of the property owned on December 31, 1971, 
will be taxed on a sliding scale until 1980. In 1972, 60 percent of 
the value will be taxed, increasing 5 percent per year until 100 
percent is reached in 1980.
After 1971 all taxpayers will be allowed to deduct foreign 
exploration and development expenses at a prescribed rate of 10 
percent of foreign exploration and development expenses not previously 
deductible, or foreign resource properties income, whichever is 
greater.
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Provincial mining taxes will not be deductible after 1976; these 
will be replaced by an additional 15 percent abatement of federal 
income tax based on production profits and taxable income.
The blanket tax exemption on the sale of mining properties by 
prospectors and grubstakers will remain in effect but only until a 
gain is made on the disposal of shares received in consideration for 
the transfer of properties to a corporation. Prospectors and grub­
stakers will be able to deduct their exploration and development 
expenses the same as other taxpayers.
These proposed changes which became effective in January 1972 
are listed as one of several reasons for a decline in mineral 
exploration in the 18 months preceding the effective date (Mining 
Journal, 1972, p. 109-110).
Future of the Canadian Mineral Policy
The mineral industry growth in Canada has developed in a free 
environment relative to most other countries, but with significant 
government assistance for infrastructure development. The purpose 
has been to attract foreign capital and induce mineral development; 
domestic firms have not been favored or protected relative to foreign- 
controlled competitors. Even incorporation in Canada is not required 
(Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, 1966).
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Foreign participation in the Canadian economy is the subject of 
considerable public debate. Two opposing schools of Canadian economic 
thought have influenced the manner and form of economic growth and 
development in Canada. The "internationalist” approach maintains that 
the allocation of resources will be most efficient under free trade 
and unrestricted capital movements into and out of Canada. The 
"nationalists" argue for more attention to the development of a 
diversified and independent Canadian economy.
The internationalist argument is based mostly on the price theory 
used in international trade economics. Accordingly, both world and 
national per capita income will be maximized if each country produces 
those goods and services for which it has a comparative cost advantage 
(under free market conditions) relative to other countries. Income 
benefits result from the greater specialization of production and 
economies of scale made possible by the larger markets. Comparative 
cost advantage is determined by the relative endowments of land, labor, 
and capital, and skills of countries.
The nationalist argument is concerned to a greater extent with 
domestic economic development with less foreign dependence.
The nationalists believe that foreign firms often set up 
subsidiaries to develop mineral deposits in other countries primarily 
to provide mineral ores to the parent for further processing and 
fabrication. The economic development policies of countries sometimes 
do encourage such corporate strategy.
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Canada's economy is more open than those of most countries. For 
example, capital inflows and outflows related to direct investment are 
unlimited throughout most of the economy and are not subject to 
concessions policy or screening.
Evidence in favor of the nationalists argument is contained in 
Table 9, listing the domestic and foreign participation in the 
manufacturing, mineral resource, and utility industries of Canada.
The manufacturing and mineral resource industries were owned and 
controlled by foreign enterprises; the United States owned and con­
trolled over 50 percent of the petroleum-natural gas and mining and 
smelting industries in 1967.
Within recent years, the Canadian government has completed 
several studies relating to direct foreign investment and taxation 
of the natural resource and manufacturing industries. Of particular 
concern was the amount of foreign investment and foreign control in 
these industries and the depletion of the natural resources for the 
benefit of a foreign nation's economy and not for the greatest benefit 
of Canada. Measures mentioned in recent address by the Minister of 
Energy, Mines, and Resources of attaining greater benefits were (1) to 
obtain majority or sole ownership of the resources; and (2) to estab­
lish facilities for processing the raw material as far downstream to 




<0 *H■U 1 <p*N•pH <r 4-1
a m Gto ON <U
u 1—1 U
uMH (U0 wX apH 3 XO w sM co4J u
3 Cd COO <0 uO >H tdr-»
x p* r*H




X 3 CO(0 X GM 3 0a) M •r4r-H5 3 rHO td *H•H jQ
h | XItd 3#N C •tH<0 t«3 O 0)rH 3
Cd X rH





X<0 0 in <<fMf CO CM CMrH rH rH rH rH pH pH rHpHO*H 00 00 ON rH rH CM MT4-1 • • • • • • •
G 0 rH rH CM CM CM CM0 </>
U 0<UJC4JO 0 rH 0 O ON ON 00X rH rH rH rH<0
§ 00 Mf Mf in m vO vOQ • • • • • • •O rH rH rH ?H rH rH</>
X0) rH •d1 vO NO vO uo mpH Mf Mf Mf Mf Mf Mf MfrHOVh Ml CO 00 IN in mt4J • • • • • • •• G CO m  vo NO 1-N00 ONCO O <fy• O3>
fN rH -H- <f <f Mf MfX co Mf *d-Ml1 Ml Mf Mf<u
rH rH 0 m CO co O0 • • • • • • •CO m  vo vo r- 00 ON</>
X3 ON rH 0 0 pH CO corH Mf Mf Mf Mf Mf Mf HtrHO»H rH rH in ON ON ON 00
4J « • • • • • •td 3 Mf in m in vo |N 00X Otd CJ <J>ctd0 8"?co 00 vO vo fN fN 00X lA Mf Mf Mf Mf Mf MfV
§ Ml* 00 CM 00 00 00 ONQ • • • « • • •Mf m vO vo IN 00 ON
CO­
XH 0)rH td So CO CM fN 00 IN.fN intd 4-> 0 • • • • • • •4J *rl rH 00 CM CO Ml vO 00 00 a a rH rH rH pH rH CMH  td E <0-u <u
603«HVhVi 3td ■u<0 0>H 3UH
3  Mf O CO Mf m VO IN
3  m VO vO vO vO VO VO3  ON ON ON ON ON ON ONJEJ rH rH rH rH «H rH rH
N  On H  (M 10 in <t
pH V© ON O  CO Mf Mf 
• • • • • • •
O  pH rH pH rH
<mI
M  O n O  H  (VI N  H
h  in oo co o  h  • • • • • •  
O H H
c m !
N rl O 00 ON O
vo vo vo vo >n in vo
N  Os vO N  00 00• • • • • • •
h  n't <f in m
cm I
|s CO CO H  H  i—I H
in in in in in in in
<f(M o O N  NON 
• • • • • • •
rH CO Mf Mf Mf Mf Mf
CM I
H  N  CO 00 N  VO VO 
CO CM CM CM CM CM CM
oo vo *-< cm cm co m  • • • • • • «  
O  rH CM CM CM CM CM
O co rv oo n  in oo
Mf CO CO CO CO CO CO
O  CO 00 O  H  CO N  
• • • • • • •
tH CM CM CO CO CO CO
B inHvOONCOHIN (Q • • • • • • •




op<fOco<tmvoiN4J i n v O v O v O v O v O v O
d l O N O N O N O N O N O N C J NP4 r—I H  H  H  r—I 1—I H
CM CO |N 00 00 o n C5N
I CO CO CO CO Mf m
o
00 00 CO ON 00 00 O
CM CO CO Mf Mf Mf lA
O
ON CO CM 1-1 CM CO vD
4  m  m  m  in in in
ON N  O  H  CO nO On 
• • • • • • •
O  r-l CM CM CM CM CM
00 CM CO H  H  pH rH
in m  in m  m  in
ON |N- o  *-< CM m• • • © • • •
O  rH CM CM CM CM CM
on on h  h  o  co inMf CO Mf -d" Mf CO CO
ON CO vO IN. IN. 00 00 
• • • • • • •O  i—4 rH H  H  H  H
<t O  ON O  1-4 rH ON 
Mf CO Mf -d- co
00 co n  n  co o  o  
• • • • • • •
O H H H H N N
ON CO 00 r-t ^  00 CM • • • • • • •
H  CO CO MT m
60c
0)6w
60s M' o  co <f m  no n  (JinNOvONOvOvOvO •H ON ON ON ON ON ON ON JEJ H  pH H  rH H  H  H
T-1554 72
s 'dw ri 3NO 3i-lON 33 1—1♦H4-J 1 4J•H st 3a x o3 ON oo t—i 11
>44 n/■No (O ■u•3 3t—1 3 3o W <JVi Vi44 Vi 33 3 aO 3O JH *33•3 « 33 CO3 3 COi-C UA Vi 3a 4J r-4i-l to i-4X 3 Oto 'O *3u 3
0 M >4-4o3 3o 3 CO•rl 3•3 Of-41 3 •r43 i—l3 3 r-43 O •i-4t—4 X3 *3> 3 34-1•i-4
M OO 3 3O r-4 3





































t—1 3 >N3  4-1 o
4J i-l r“t
O  O- a





ON N  CO CO CM CM H
CD ON N  N  VO NO vO 
• • • • • • •o</>■
CM CM CM CM CM CM CM
O<fr
m  ON ON 00 00 00 00





H  H  CM • • » I
I H  H  I I I
o
CM N  ^  H  rl H  rl
CM
CM CM CO VO VO N  00 tH H  H  H  H  rH rH
vO H  ^  O  CM UO ON 
• • • • • • •
O  i- l rH CM CM CM CM
oo co oo CO CO oo oo CM in •n X X X mON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON
o CM CM CM CM x  s t ON 00 X X CM n
• • • • • • • • • • • « • •
St
CO-









N*x St oo ON o o r-4 X X X cn cn CM iH
m ri i-» r* CO 00 00 00 00 00 X X X X
1".ON tH CM CM x m X ON 00 CM rH CM CM• • • • • • • • • % • • • •
CM
■co­








CO N  CO CO Mf ON CM 
» • • « • • •  







rH St o X St X X r*i 3 st o X St X Xi4 m X X X X X X X X X X X X X X3 ON ON ON ON ON ON ON 4J ON ON ON ON ON ON ON












3  .1-4 >44•o o
3t-l CO
o  3c o•H







JO a  X 
'O 0
ecu -oCD CO 4J 3
I co too
§ c  1—1 •«











6  co 
O 3 o o




aco 3a 5 
co o u u4J o





£  ^  CO 4-1
V< M-4 
3  O4-1cO >»





Vi COt-i a>CO *r4 
4J 




























>O •O  cu




> -H (D 4J
0 
O 
Uz  E3 *3 
JO








3 5O 3  CO 4J 4Jo
T-1554 73
ANALYSIS OF THE MINERAL POLICIES
Foreign mineral policies must be analyzed on the basis of 
particular economic, social, and cultural history of the country.
The prime consideration of the government of the host country 
is maximizing the benefits derived from the exploitation of the 
mineral resources. It has the duty of implementing a development 
policy by making and administering laws dealing with taxation, labor 
matters, customs tariffs, currency and exchange problems, and the 
operation of foreign countries.
Many factors combine to influence the decision of a mining company 
to expend large amounts of exploration monies into a particular country. 
The two most important are the country's mineral potential and the 
general political stability. If these qualities are present, then the 
type of the national or provincial mining code and taxation policies 
resume major importance.
The government can improve its knowledge of the mineral potential 
(if it indeed exists) through geologic surveys and mineral resource 
studies. Stability of the government can be demonstrated only by 
experience and time. The government can, however, improve its position 
of attracting foreign capital investment through the establishment of 
equitable mining laws, royalties, and taxation policies.
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There are three basic methods in which the host government can 
obtain money from the mining industry: (1) an ad valorem tax on
production, (2) an income tax on profits, and (3) a variable tax rate 
on profits. The ad valorem tax on production is a direct cost and 
may decrease profits to make some operations uneconomic. An income 
tax on profits at a fixed rate does not allow for fluctuations in 
the margin of profit such as a variable tax rate; the variable tax 
would increase as the margin of profit increases and decreases as 
the margin of profit decreases.
Development theory, particularly as applied to developing countries, 
is concerned with specific national efforts directed toward developing 
new or strengthening existing comparative cost advantage. Few devel­
oping countries appear to believe that significant changes in their 
comparative advantage can be achieved with an open economy. Such an 
economy is characterized by unrestricted capital flows, unregulated 
entry by foreign participators, and little protection for domestic 
firms from foreign competitors. The economic interests of the parent 
firm and/or the home country are not likely to coincide with those of 
the subsidiary and/or the host country. Developing countries there­
fore typically assert that some kind of control or limit on foreign 
participation is required to ensure at least minimum net benefits to 
their countries (Mohr, 1972).
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Nor would most developing countries choose to form a trading bloc 
with a far more industrially advanced country, unless strict guarantees 
were given for further development of industry within their country.
The Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC) 
and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are among 
the trade associations that have been formed by developing countries. 
CIPEC, for example, seeks to obtain higher prices for primary commodi­
ties from overseas buyers, i.e. the developed countries, by bargaining 
and by controlling supply.
The Staple Theory, as developed by Harold Innis and further 
interpreted by other Canadian economists, hypothesizes that further 
growth will be induced from the "linkages" which develop with other 
parts of the economy (Mohr, 1972). These linkages include the 
development of industries (1) to further process or use the staple 
as an input to the manufacture of another product (forward linkage),
(2) to provide inputs for the extraction of the staple (backward 
linkage), and (3) to produce goods and services for final consumers 
who directly or indirectly owe their income to staple production 
(final demand linkage).
The theory is important not only because staple exports provide 
a large source of Canada's income, but also their production may 
result in further development of the Canadian economy. It should be 
recognized that Innis1 Staple Theory, as it has been interpreted, is 
based upon neoclassical price and international trade theory--the 
international position.
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The international position relates to trade among nations based 
on comparative cost advantage; each country trading those items which 
it can produce advantageously. These goods are then traded for those 
items which other countries produce at a comparative cost advantage. 
This theory is not always politically and socially acceptable because 
of the impact of fluctuating foreign exchange rates on the domestic 
economy and of national defense considerations (Habler, 1961).
The data supplied by the mode1 minera1_1aw, the Indonesian 
mineral policy recently formed, „the, Mexican, mineral., policy, and 
Canadian mineral. Dolicyvindicate^a trend in which, the host country 
wants to. control the^mineral, industry-more -ef fectively. ̂ Diversified 
Industrializatjlon^withini;the4:hios.t-^count:ry^a^pears^tp-vbaxthe,d^inant 
.theme_with. nationali?atlon.^^he^minera 1. industry, thei;prime^mO|ver.
The developed and developing nations cannot divorce themselves 
from one another; the developed or industrialized nations need the 
natural resources occurring in the developing nations. The developing 
nations need the foreign investment and the associated benefits of 
technology, markets, and foreign exchange from the exports of mineral 
commodities to industrialize their economy. Initially, the host 
government may sacrifice some benefits to lure foreign investors into 
the country, but at some eventual stage of development the investor 
must realize the host country will demand increased benefits from 
the operation.
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It behooves the host country to allow the Investor a fair 
return on the investment and to allow for the good as well as the 
bad in negotiating the contract prior to development of the explora­
tion program.
As indicated in the model mineral law the most important 
ingredient is fair play. Important considerations of a mineral 
policy are guaranteed tenure, stable government, and taxation 
policies, relatively free judgment in operating the property, and 
an impartial court to settle disputes.
The Indonesian policy in which a foreign company develops the 
mineral resource by contract arrangements is one of the most recently 
formed mineral policy. Perhaps the greatest deterrent is the unproven 
stability of the government in making investment in a mineral operation 
in this country. However, reported data indicate several major com­
panies have made commitments to explore and develop deposits in this 
country.
From the viewpoint of "nationalization," the Mexican policy 
provides a prime example of initial distrust when the policy was 
introduced in 1961 to one of acceptance in 1971. The major 
inducement was tax incentives--if an operating company would Mexicanize, 
the production taxes were reduced. In 1971 approximately 99 percent 
of the major mineral operations had been Mexicanized. The major 
deterrent to Mexicanization, after acceptance by the industry, was 
the lack of Mexican capital to purchase 51 percent of the operation.
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The Canadian mineral policy is very similar to that of the 
United States. Prior to 1971 the Canadian policy contained a 3 -year 
tax holiday which greatly enhanced the probability of a successful 
mineral operation by allowing early recovery of the investment. It 
was this particular regulation which may associate with the renewal 
of a mining industry in Erie, Ireland.
The provinces in Canada are much more independent in establishing 
mineral policies than are the sub-territories or states in Indonesia, 
Mexico, or the United States. Therefore, each province may establish 
a policy based upon its economic and social needs. The Canadian 
government exercises control over certain strategic minerals in a 
manner similar to that of the Indonesian and Mexican governments.
The Canadian government, influenced by the control of the major 
industries by foreigners, is investigating methods such as nationali­




Results of the study indicate a trend toward self-determination 
of the host governments regarding the disposition of their mineral 
resources. The three mineral policies investigated are diverse in 
the method in which the governments attempt to maximize benefits that 
can be obtained through the establishment of a mineral industry.
The prime aim of each mineral policy apparently is to develop a 
diversified industrial economy, but because of social or economic 
conditions a different approach is employed.
Indonesia, because of lack of domestic capital, allows total 
direct foreign investment within contract negotiations for each 
operation. Revenues are obtained through taxation. Experience in 
mining is provided by a clause stipulating that within 5 years 75 
percent of each job classification must be occupied by domestic 
nationals. After 5 years it may be possible to nationalize without 
a major disruption in production as experienced by Chile.
Mexico started the nationalization program in 1961 to revitalize 
a stagnant mining industry resulting from government policies de­
emphasizing a mineral economy and causing most operations to become 
uneconomic through excessive taxation. The current program requires 
concessions issued by the government to operate in the nation and 
51 percent of the company equity to be controlled by Mexicans. After
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the expropriation by the Chilean government of the mineral industry, 
companies viewed the Mexican policy as one in which the stable govern­
ment would respect the regulations of the mineral policy. In other 
words, the companies had a firm commitment from a stable government.
Revenues to the country are through a share of profits and 
taxation.
The intermediate management of the operations is under the 
control of the foreign investor, but the Mexicans have a majority of 
one in the top management positions. Ninety percent of the employment 
should be Mexican nationals.
The Canadians have an open mineral policy which has been very 
effective in the development of the mineral resources which are 
primarily exported. The foreign exchange earned by the exports 
creates a favorable balance of payments, but in recent years the 
Canadian government has become alarmed by the control exercised by 
foreign investors in the major industries of the economy. Currently, 
there are no controls in the major provinces restraining direct 
foreign investment--the company can operate freely without undue 
restrictions as to producing and marketing the products.
Revenues are through taxation of the products as well as imports.
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From data surveyed for this study the author foresees the 
developing countries adopting mineral policies in which the host 
country participates in ownership of the mineral industry. Attempts 
will be made to establish an industrial society within each nation, 
and it is then that the international trade theory can be most 
effective--each nation producing the commodity for which it has a 
comparative cost advantage.
Of course, this requires free trade movement which results in 
the interdependence of domestic economies and a threat to national 
security based on the production of strategic material. Perhaps 
there will be no realignment of trading patterns, but the industrial­
ized nations will need to respect the sovereignty of the developing 
nations. Also more of the profits, within reason, should be used to 
benefit the host countries economy through the building of secondary 
industries and transportation networks.
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